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I. Introduction
This article provides an annual survey of the law summarizing
developments in oil and gas for the State of Montana. Oil and gas in the
State of Montana make up a relatively small portion of the state’s profile;
Montana currently ranks fourteenth in crude oil production and twentieth in
natural gas production in the United States. 1
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
A. State Legislative Developments
The Montana State Legislature only convenes in odd years. The State
ended its 2019 Session on April 25, 2019. As such, there was no regular
legislative session in 2020 and no special sessions. Therefore, there were
no significant legislative developments for 2020.
B. State Regulatory Developments
1. ARM 36.22.1242
Amendments have been made to ARM 36.22.1242 regarding Reports by
Producers – Tax Report – Tax Rate effective January 1, 2020. Specifically,
ARM 36.22.1242(2) has been amended to reflect that the privilege and
license tax on every barrel of crude petroleum and each 10,000 cubic feet of
natural gas produced, saved, and marketed, or stored within the state or
exported therefrom shall be 83.33 percent (previously, 100 percent) of the
rate authorized in Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-131, (3/10 of 1%) of the
market value thereof. This rule effectively applies to all crude petroleum
and natural gas produced on and after January 1, 2020.

1. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Montana State Profile and Energy
Estimates, https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=MT ( last visited August 21, 2020).
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III. Judicial Developments
A. Montana Supreme Court
1. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following question to
the Montana Supreme Court: “Whether, under Montana law, dinosaur
fossils constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose of a mineral reservation?”2 The
Montana Supreme Court answered, stating, “We conclude that, under
Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose
of a mineral reservation.”3
The certified question arose due to a dispute between owners of the
surface estate (the “Murrays”) and the majority owners of the underlying
mineral estate (the “Seversons”).4 By a 2005 deed, the Murrays acquired
the Seversons’ interest in the surface estate, and the Seversons reserved a
combined two-thirds of the mineral estate. 5 Following execution of the
deed, the Murrays discovered a “spike cluster” of fossils on the property. 6
A subsequent investigation revealed the fossils were extremely rare and
valuable. 7
Procedurally, this case began in 2013 when the Seversons asserted an
ownership interest in the fossils based upon their mineral title. 8 In
response, the Murrays filed suit in Montana state court seeking a judgment
declaring that the Seversons did not own an interest in the fossils. 9 The
Seversons removed the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Montana and counterclaimed, seeking a judgment that fossils are
“minerals” and part of their mineral estate. 10 The district court granted
summary judgment to the Murrays, and upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 11 After a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit certified the
question above and the Montana Supreme Court accepted. 12
2. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying
questions to 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80.
3. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80, 93.
4. Murray, 464 P.3d at 81-82.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 82.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 83.
12. Id.
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Rejecting the Seversons’ argument that the fossils qualified as minerals
under past Montana jurisprudence and a Texas two-part test, the Montana
Supreme Court narrowed in on three factors.13 First, it acknowledged that
rarity and value may be a factor in determining mineral status, but the
Similarly, whether a substance is
inquiry is not determinative. 14
“scientifically” a mineral is not determinative unless the parties intended to
use a scientific definition for minerals. 15 Last, the court added to its
consideration “the relation of the material in question to the surface of the
land, and the method and effect of the material’s removal.” 16 In sum, the
court stated that the “best method for determining whether a substance fits
within the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘mineral’ is to use contextual
clues.”17
Applying that method, the court first examined the language of
“minerals” used in the subject deed. 18 It highlighted that the subject deed
referred to “oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and other minerals,” and to the right of
“mining, drilling, exploring, operating, and developing said lands.” 19
Secondly, the court noted that Montana statutes use the word “mineral” in
several contexts, but never mention or contemplate fossils. 20 Thus, “in the
context of a general mineral reservation deed, where the parties have not
manifested a different intention in the transacting document, the language
identifying ‘mineral’ would not ordinarily and naturally include fossils.”21
Next, the court considered “whether the mineral content of the material
in question renders it ‘rare and valuable.’” 22 The court concluded that
“because the rarity and value of dinosaur fossils is not a circumstance of
their mineral composition and consequent usefulness for refinement and
economic exploitation, they are not considered to fall within the ordinary
and natural meaning of ‘minerals’ as that term is used in a general mineral
deed.”23 The last factor the court considered is “relation to the surface of
the land, and the method and effect of its removal.” 24 Analogizing dinosaur
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 87-89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
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fossils to limestone, the court found that dinosaur fossils “bear a
relationship so close to the surface as to be reasonably considered as part of
the surface, rather than the mineral, estate.” 25
In sum, the court declined to “stretch the term ‘mineral’ so far outside its
ordinary meaning as to include dinosaur fossils” and concluded “that, under
Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose
of a mineral reservation.”26
B. Federal Court Cases
1. Northern Plains Resource Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit)
The United States District Court for the District of Montana issued an
initial ruling in this case on April 15, 202027 and subsequently modified it
on May 11, 202028. Defendant-intervenor State of Montana appealed the
decision to the Ninth Circuit, which remains pending. By its modified
ruling, the district court enjoined any dredge or fill activities for new
pipeline construction projects under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the
“Corps”) Nationwide Permit 12 (“NWP 12”) until the Corps engages in the
consultation process required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”) and other environmental statutes and regulations. 29
The Corps has authority to regulate discharges into the navigable
waterways of the United States pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act. 30 Pursuant to such authority, the Corps first issued NWP 12 in 1977 to
regulate discharges resultingfrom activities associated with utility lines and
related facilities.31 Utility lines include oil and gas pipelines and related
activities such as construction, maintenance, and removal of pipelines like
the Keystone XL Pipeline.32 NWP 12 allows discharges of dredged or fill
material into U.S. waters.33
25. Id.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Northern Plains Res.Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. CV-19-44-GFBMM, 2020 WL 1875455, at *1 (D. Mont. April 15, 2020), amended by 2020 WL 3638125
(D. Mont.).
28. Northern Plains Res.Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. CV-19-44-GFBMM, 2020 WL 3638125, at *14 (D. Mont. May 11, 2020).
29. Northern Plains Res.Council, 2020 WL 3638125 at *14.
30. Northern Plains Res.Council, 2020 WL 1875455 at *1.
31. Id.
32. See Id.
33. Id.
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Plaintiffs, a collective of environmental organizations, sought review of
the Corps’ decision to renew NWP 12. The Corps asserted that in reissuing
NWP 12, it had considered the environmental impact as required by the
ESA and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) because
General Condition 18 of NWP 12 prohibits activities likely to jeopardize
endangered species or adversely modify critical habitats and activities
under NWP 12 would have minimal impacts. 34 Therefore, the Corps
argued, it did not need to consult the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and/or
the National Marine Fisheries Services prior to reissuing NWP 12.35
Plaintiffs argued that the Corps’ failure to undertake such consultation
violated the ESA and that the Corps should have initiated programmatic
consultation during reissuance of NWP 12.36 Noting the low ESA threshold
for consultation, the district court found that the Corps should have initiated
a consultation under the ESA prior to reissuing NWP 12.37 The court
further stated that the Corps may not circumvent Section 7 of the ESA by
allowing project-level reviews or relying on General Condition 18 of NWP
12.38
Ultimately, the district court enjoined the Corps from authorizing “any
dredge or fill activities under NWP 12 pending completion of the
consultation process and compliance with all environmental statutes and
regulations” and then modified the initial order to apply only to new
pipeline construction projects and not non-pipeline and/or routine
maintenance, inspection, and repair activities on existing NWP 12
projects. 39
2. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Bernhardt
The United States District Court for the District of Montana voided acres
of federal leases due to actions by the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) in a sage-grouse habitat area.40 In 2015, the BLM amended
provisions in 98 land-management plans in an effort to protect sagegrouse. 41 Specifically, the plans required that “[p]riority will be given to
34. Id, at *2-3.
35. Id. at *3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *5.
38. Id. at *6.
39. Northern Plains Res.Council, 2020 WL 3638125 at *14.
40. Montana Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 WL
2615631, at *1 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020).
41. Montana Wildlife Fed’n, 2020 WL 2615631 at *1.
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leasing and development…outside of [sage-grouse habitat].”42 Here, the
central question to be answered was what it meant to give something
priority. 43
Plaintiffs brought suit seeking a review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging that BLM violated the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) when it executed certain lease
sales in December 2017 and March 2018 (Montana) and in June 2018
(Wyoming).44 The tracts subject to the leases were entirely or significantly
within “General” or “Priority” sage-grouse habitat.45
Lease sales conducted by BLM are subject to the FLPMA, which
requires compliance “by developing, maintaining and revising Resource
Management Plans (‘RMPs’)” that “establish ‘[l]and areas for limited,
restricted or exclusive use’ and determine ‘[a]llowable resource uses…and
related levels of production or use to be maintained.”46 The applicable
RMPs “directed BLM field offices to prioritize leasing outside” of the
general and priority sage-grouse habitat areas.47 Instruction Memorandum
2016-143 (“2016 IM”) provided additional guidance to the implementation
of the RMPs.48 Specifically, it required prioritization at both the leasing
and development stages, setting forth “six broad sections that each contain
different actions” to accomplish the conservation goals.49 Subsequently,
BLM issued “Instruction Memorandum 2018-026 (“2018 IM”), which
replaced the 2016 IM and stated “[i]n effect, the BLM does not need to
lease and develop outside of [sage-grouse] habitat management areas before
considering any leasing and development within” them and “should
implement the new prioritization policy” where “the BLM has a backlog of
Expressions of Interest for leasing.” 50
As a threshold matter, the court first decided whether or not the 2018 IM
was a “final agency action” such that it could be challenged and concluded
that it was.51 Second, the court found that the 2018 IM violated the
FLPMA because it contracted the 2015 amended land-management plans in
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5-7.
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two ways: (1) “limiting the prioritization requirement only to situations
when BLM faces a backlog of EOIs,” and (2) it “misconstrues the 2015
Plans and renders the prioritization requirement into a mere procedural
hurdle.”52 Moreover, the court found the BLM violated the APA for lack of
a “satisfactory explanation” as to why it reinterpreted prioritization to apply
only when there was a backlog.53 Finally, the court determined the lease
sales violated the FLPMA because they “explicitly, or in effect, follow the
same rationale as the 2018 IM.”54
Accordingly, the lease sales were voided with the court adding “BLM’s
errors undercut the very reason that the 2015 Plans created a priority
requirement in the first place and prevent BLM from fulfilling that
requirement’s goals and the errors here occurred at the beginning of
the…lease sales process, infecting everything that followed.” 55

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id.
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